How to Identify Scientifc Revolutions?

Conceptualizing scientific revolutions by means of explicating their causes, their underlying structure and implications has been an important part of Kuhn's philosophy of science and belongs to its legacy. In this paper we show that such “explanatory concepts” of revolutions should be distinguished from a concept based on the identification criteria of scientific revolutions. The aim of this paper is to offer such a concept, and to show that it can be fruitfully used for a further elaboration of the explanatory conceptions of revolutions. On the one hand, our concept can be used to test the preciseness and accuracy of these conceptions, by examining to what extent their criteria fit revolutions as they are defined by our concept. On the other hand, our concept can serve as the basis on which these conceptions can be further specified. We will present four different explanatory concepts of revolutions – Kuhn's, Thagard's, Chen's and Barker's, and Laudan's – and point to the ways in which each of them can be further specified in view of our concept

Causation in perspective: are all causal claims equally warranted?

In a paper ‘Causation in Context’ (2007) Peter Menzies has argued that the truth value of causal judgments is perspective-relative (i.e. their truth value does not depend entirely on mind-independent structures). His arguments are confined to causation as difference making (a term he uses to cover probabilistic, counterfactual and regularity views of causation). In this paper we first briefly present Menzies’ arguments. Then we show that perspective-relativity also holds for causation in the sense of process theories. These parts of the paper prepare the ground for the topic we really want to investigate: we want to find out whether this perspective-relativity leads to an epistemic predicament with respect to causal claims. The potential epistemic predicament we consider is that all causal claims would be equally warranted

Black ravens, white shoes and scientific evidence : the Ravens Paradox and/in scientific practice

1BLACK RAVENS, WHITE SHOES AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE.THE RAVENS PARADOX AND/IN SCIENTIFIC PRACTICEErik Weber, Mathieu Beirlaen&Inge De BalCentre for Logic and Philosophy of ScienceGhent University (UGent)Blandijnberg 2, B-9000 Gent , BelgiumAbstractA well-known consequence of Hempel’s account of confirmation is the RavensParadox. In this paper we discuss this paradox from the viewpointof scientific practice. The main worry, when looking at this paradox from a scientific practiceperspective, is that it seems to lead to problematic methodological advice for scientists: it seems to licence ‘indoor ornithology’. We show that this problematic advice only follows from Hempel’s account if one adoptsa suboptimal viewof what counts as evidence for anhypothesis. We present and defend a more sophisticated viewof what counts as evidence, whichtakesrandom sampling–an important methodological principle in scientific practice–into account. On this sophisticated view, the problematic methodological advice connected tothe RavensParadox is avoided

Indispensability arguments in favour of reductive explanations

Instances of explanatory reduction are often advocated on metaphysical grounds; given that the only real things in the world are subatomic particles and their interaction, we have to try to explain everything in terms of the laws of physics. In this paper, we show that explanatory reduction cannot be defended on metaphysical grounds. Nevertheless, indispensability arguments for reductive explanations can be developed, taking into account actual scientific practice and the role of epistemic interests. Reductive explanations might be indispensable to address some epistemic interest answering a specific explanation-seeking question in the most accurate, adequate and efficient way. Just like explanatory pluralists often advocate the indispensability of higher levels of explanation pointing at the pragmatic value of the explanatory information obtained on these higher levels, we argue that explanatory reduction – traditionally understood as the contender of pluralism – can be defended in a similar way. The pragmatic value reductionist, lower level explanations might have in the biomedical sciences and the social sciences is illustrated by some case studies